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86-"3&1":)A continuing theme of our work, and that of others, has been the failure of insolvency
law to keep pace with the new problems faced by low-income debtors. Researchers have
suggested that the cost of personal bankruptcy puts it beyond the reach of many of those in need
of it, though it has proven difficult to demonstrate conclusively that large numbers of lowincome debtors would take advantage of bankruptcy if the price was lower. In this paper, we
analyze another industry — the not-for-profit credit counselling industry — that has grown
rapidly in recent years and that offers a different sort of remedy for financial distress.
We begin in Section II with a brief history of the credit counseling industry in Canada and in the
US. We show how the industry has evolved from a small set of government-subsidized and
community-based not-for-profit groups into an industry that is heavily subsidized by credit
suppliers and, for the most part, lacking any significant community connection. In Section III,
we briefly set out the regulatory framework that seems to encompass credit counselling agencies
(“CCA”), both for-profit and not-for-profit. We do not, however, reach any conclusions on the
application of this framework to Canadian CCA. Instead, we describe the concepts underlying
the framework in a coordinated way. In Section IV, based on a set of "mystery calls" to the
largest CCA, we show that most simply have nothing to offer low-income debtors and that most
do not do a good job of providing information concerning the alternatives available to them.
Rather than introducing substantive legislative or legal rules to help low-income debtors, the
Canadian federal government has chosen instead to promote financial education with its 2010
Task Force on Financial Literacy. In Section V, we briefly analyze the Task Force process,
suggesting that it largely overlooked the needs of the poor.!
!
A#@)273.-:!insolvency, bankruptcy, debt, commercial law, law and finance!
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I. Introduction
Past decades have seen a substantial increase in the extent to which people with low incomes
have been able to borrow. In countries like Canada, low-income people have increasingly
borrowed on their credit cards or through payday lenders.
The opportunity to borrow has brought many benefits, ranging from access to capital to start a
small business to an increased ability to work through financial emergencies. At the same time,
the opportunity to borrow has also increased the number of low-income people who are heavily
in debt and have no realistic possibility of repaying what they owe.
A continuing theme of our work, and that of others, has been the failure of insolvency law to
keep pace with the new problems faced by low-income debtors. Researchers have suggested that
the cost of personal bankruptcy puts it beyond the reach of many of those in need of it, though it
has proven difficult to demonstrate conclusively that large numbers of low-income debtors
would take advantage of bankruptcy if the price was lower.
In this paper, we analyze another industry — the not-for-profit credit counselling industry — that
has grown rapidly in recent years and that offers a different sort of remedy for financial distress.
We begin in Section II with a brief history of the credit counselling industry in Canada and in the
US. We show how the industry has evolved from a small set of government-subsidized and
community-based not-for-profit groups into an industry that is heavily subsidized by credit
suppliers and, for the most part, lacking any significant community connection.
In Section III, we briefly set out the regulatory framework that seems to encompass credit
counselling agencies (“CCA”), both for-profit and not-for-profit. We do not, however, reach any
conclusions on the application of this framework to Canadian CCA. Instead, we describe the
concepts underlying the framework in a coordinated way.
In Section IV, based on a set of "mystery calls" to the largest CCA, we show that most simply
have nothing to offer low-income debtors and that most do not do a good job of providing
information concerning the alternatives available to them.
Rather than introducing substantive legislative or legal rules to help low-income debtors, the
Canadian federal government has chosen instead to promote financial education with its 2010
Task Force on Financial Literacy. In Section V, we briefly analyze the Task Force process,
suggesting that it largely overlooked the needs of the poor.
II. A Brief History of the Credit Counselling Industry
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Credit Counselling Services of Metropolitan Toronto (CCSMT), which opened in the summer of
1966, was the first not-for-profit CCA in Canada.1 At the beginning, CCSMT’s only three
employees were its executive director, George E. Penfold, one counsellor and a secretary. The
fledgling agency had arisen from a committee formed by the Social Planning Council of Toronto
in 1965.
According to the Globe and Mail, “[t]he cost of the credit counselling service is borne by the
credit-granting business community and the federal and provincial governments.”2 From the
mid-1960s until 1991, the provincial government generally subsidized 60% of the operating
expenses of not-for-profit CCA in Ontario, including CCSMT.3 Most of these agencies were
based in particular communities and their number grew rapidly, up to 10 in 1973, to 28 by 1978
and to 30 in 1991.4 In general, the federal government transferred money to the province to help
with the provincial contribution, although the federal percentage varied over time. Ontario CCA
also received grants from the United Way.5
From the beginning, creditors played several important roles for the CCA. First, they returned to
the CCA a small percentage – less than 10% it seems — of the funds they received as a result of
the activities of the CCA.6 Second, staff from the creditors took up positions on the boards of
directors of the CCA. In addition, the employees of the CCA often had held previous jobs in the
credit-granting community. For example, Penfold, the executive director of Credit Counselling
Services of Metropolitan Toronto from its inception until the mid-1980s, had previously worked
for the Household Finance Corporation; the first CCSMT counsellor had previously been a
“credit manager”.
The tension between serving poor debtors and collecting outstanding debts for creditors arose
almost immediately. This can be seen in an exchange of letters in the Globe and Mail between
Moses McKay, a former CCSMT board member, and Penfold. On May 20, 1968, McKay wrote
that “… the taxpayers who pay over 80% through the federal and provincial taxes of the cost of
running the Credit Counselling Service should know that this organization resembles a collection
agency more than a debt counselling organization.”7 The issue that McKay raised was that the
clients who were being referred to CCSMT were generally only those who had income beyond
that deemed necessary to live at a moderate standard of living and who agreed to use that
“excess” income to repay their debts.8 Those who either did not have enough money to live on
or who would require more than three years to repay their outstanding debts were not helped. In
a May 24, 1968 letter responding to McKay, Penfold took issue with the characterization of
CCSMT as a “collection agency”, citing a Social Planning Council of Toronto document that had
1

Estaban Uribe and Amanda Tait, “Credit Counselling: A Way Forward” The Public Interest Advocacy Centre(30
March 2007), online: PIAC <http://www.piac.ca/financial/credit_counselling_a_way_forward/> [Uribe and Tait].
2
"Metro Credit Counselling opens centre tomorrow” Globe and Mail (20 September 1966) p. 11.
3
“A decade of debt lies ahead” Globe and Mail (9 May 1980); Warren Potter "Budget now for Christmas" Toronto
Star (10 December 1985) ES12; Ellen Roseman, "Credit counsellors face money worries" Globe and Mail (23
November 1991) B6.
4
Reports of the Ministry of Community and Social Services, various years.
5
Ellen Roseman, "Credit counsellors face money worries" The Globe and Mail (23 November 1991) B6.
6
Ibid.
7
Moses McKay, "Credit Counselling" Globe and Mail (20 May 1968).
8
Ibid.
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concluded that the CCSMT was a “valuable and useful service”.9 The exchange ended with
McKay writing back on May 30, 1968 that Penfold’s point was irrelevant as long as CCMST
was refusing to help those who had no means to repay their debts.10 The exchange between
McKay and Penfold has remained relevant to this day. We argue below that modern CCA
provide little help to those who are unable to enter a debt management plan.
In the fall of 1991, the New Democratic Party government of Bob Rae announced that it was
ending its subsidy of the CCA.11 In the legislature, the Minister of Community and Social
Services argued that creditors needed to play a larger role in financing credit counselling.12 This
unexpected announcement forced the CCA to either close or find other sources of funds. The
identity of the “other source of funds” rapidly became clear as creditors took the place of the
provincial government as the major source of revenue for the CCA. The reliance on funding
from creditors should have immediately raised questions about how the CCA were to manage the
now increased tension between serving the interests of clients — handling their debts in the most
effective way — and serving the interests of its funders — collecting as much as possible on the
debts owed. In retrospect, it seems naïve for the Minister to have believed that a major change in
funding would not lead to a major change in the character of the CCA.
In 2005, the CCA landscape was greatly altered by the start-up of InCharge Debt Solutions
Canada (IDS), then a subsidiary of the Florida-based InCharge Debt Solutions.13 Following the
“new school” US credit counselling model, IDS works with clients almost exclusively over the
telephone. By contrast, the Credit Counselling Service of Metropolitan Toronto (which now
operates under the name of Credit Canada) runs several centres in the Greater Toronto Area
(GTA) where clients can receive in-person counselling if they so choose. IDS operates out of a
small office park in suburban Mississauga, in offices well-equipped for telephone counselling
but without much space for in-person counselling. In 2006, a second “new school” credit
counsellor — Consolidated Credit Counseling Services of Canada (CCCS) — set up operations
in the GTA.14 Where Credit Canada once had the GTA “market” to itself, it now faced two
strong competitors who seem heavily focused on setting up and administering debt management
plans, relegating other activities to a secondary role. Neither IDS nor CCCS has any visible

9

G. E. Penfold, “Credit Counselling” Globe and Mail (24 May 1968).
Moses McKay, “Credit Counselling” Globe and Mail (30 May 1968).
11
"Credit advice trimmed" Globe and Mail (9 November 1991) A7.
12
See Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol A (19
December 1991) at 1450 (Hon Mrs Boyd), online: <http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/35-1/l102a.htm>.
The Minister also pointed out that cuts to federal funding for social programs made the action necessary. In addition,
she hoped that “the federal bankruptcy bill” would mandate creditor contributions.
13
IDS is no longer formally associated with its Florida-based parent. Nonetheless, at least two of its board members
are intimately involved with the Florida version of IDS. Moreover, IDS Canada returns 20% of its revenues to IDS
Florida in return for using the IDS name and for the initial set-up funds. (2008 IDS Annual report).
14
Based only on the strong similarity between their websites, we speculate that CCCS is related to the American
credit counselling agency known by the same name. For the website of the American CCCS, see
http://www.consolidatedcredit.org/?t=t8mdsp ; the website of the Canadian CCCS is
http://www.consolidatedcredit.ca/?partnerid=1000 . We have been unable, however, to confirm this relationship.
10
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interaction with any GTA community; that is, they may be not-for-profits but they are not
community-based.15
One consequence of the increased competition has been an advertising battle waged on GTA
buses and subways, and on the internet. CCCS reported spending $1.2 million on advertising,
closely followed by IDS at $1.1 million and Credit Canada at $800,000.16
According to the T3010 forms that all registered charities are required to file with the Canada
Revenue Agency, Credit Canada has now fallen to the third position among Canadian not-forprofit CCA. The biggest agency, as measured by the size of revenues, is now CCCS which listed
revenues of $6.5 million for the fiscal year ending in October 2010. IDS is second with reported
revenues of $5.4 million at the end of calendar 2009. At the same time, Credit Canada reported
revenues of $4.5 million.
Outside of Ontario, the industry developed more slowly. According to Margaret Johnson, one of
its founders, the Credit Counselling Society of British Columbia (CCCSBC) arose in 1996 from
the interest of the Credit Grantors Association of Vancouver in the credit counselling model that
was then in place in Ontario.17 Johnson and Scott Hannah, who would later be appointed as the
executive director of the new agency, were hired by the Credit Grantors Association to go to
Toronto to observe the operations of CCSMT and to talk with two of its principals, Duke Streiger
and Laurie Campbell.
Armed with an initial contribution of $250,000 from the Credit Grantors Association, the Credit
Counselling Society soon began operations. On November 8, 1996, the Vancouver Sun
announced the opening of the first CCCSBC office. According to Scott Hannah, its first and only
director, CCCSBC aimed to "... complement government programs and provide an alternative to
private credit counselling services which may charge substantial fees."18 The new not-for-profit
agency would receive "the bulk of its funding from banks, credit unions and credit card issuers."
Operationally, the Society was funded by a contribution of 25% of all money collected for the
banks and 15% of all funds collected for finance companies, retailers and other creditors. In
addition, debtors using the services of the Society paid the Society 10% of all monies paid to
their creditors, up to a maximum of $50 per month.19

15

The Congressional Report on abuses by the US credit counselling industry entitled “Profiteering in a Not-forprofit Industry” distinguished between “old school” credit counsellors that had been community-based and “new
school” credit counsellors that lacked any such base. See US, Profiteering in a Not-for-profit Industry: Hearing
Before the Permanent Subcommitte on Investigation, 108th Cong (24 March 2004), online: Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
<http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_id=35837baf-2e06-4ab6-95fa624fbf2aae76>.
16
The current paragraph and the following one are based on the T3010 forms filed by the CCA mentioned. These
forms for each CCA are available online: Canada Revenue Agency, Charities Listing <http://www.craarc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/lstngs/menu-eng.html>.
17
E-mail communication with Margaret Johnson, President, Solutions Credit Counselling Service (10 July 2011).
18
Michael Kane, "Credit advisors open office in Royal City" Vancouver Sun (8 November 1996) Presumably, the
government program to which CCCSBC was a complement was the BC Debtor Assistance program, discussed
below.
19
Ibid.
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The Credit Counseling Service of Alberta (CCSA) was a not-for-profit organization established
in 1997 with funding from the provincial government. The new service was designed to take
over the operation of Alberta’s Orderly Payment of Debts (OPD) program. The province
gradually removed its annual funding and CCSA became self-sufficient, in part by charging for
personalized financial counselling.
The most recent development in this industry was a change in the method by which the major
banks funded the CCA. Under an agreement administered by the Canadian Bankers Association,
the major banks had established a standard “fair share” — a percentage of debtor repayments
that the creditors return to the CCA.20 In the fall of 2009, the creditors decided to determine the
percentage that they would return to the CCA on a case-by-case basis.21
The history of credit counselling in the US will be relevant to our legal discussion below and we
briefly summarize that history here.22 In the first half of the twentieth century in the US, forprofit debt-adjusters (also known as debt-poolers) negotiated with a debtor’s creditors to reduce
the principal owing and, after an agreement had been reached, collected payments from the
debtors and passed them on to the creditors. In the 1950s, because of the high fees charged by the
debt-adjusters (and other abuses), many states passed laws preventing for-profit firms from
providing credit counselling, effectively banned them from the practice.
The state laws did not prevent not-for-profit organizations from providing credit counselling and,
encouraged by credit granters, not-for-profit community-based credit counselling began in
earnest. This 1950s development set the stage for the 1965 establishment of the Credit
Counselling Services of Metropolitan Toronto which followed a similar model. Crucially, this
group of American CCA were not focused primarily on developing debt-management plans,
although such plans were certainly part of their operations. They provided “information to the
public on budgeting, buying practices, and the sound use of consumer credit through the use of
films, speakers, and publications” in the words of the Internal Revenue Service ruling that
validated their not-for-profit status.23 The debt-management plans established by these CCA
called for the full repayment of the principal owed but also provided for reduction in future
interest payments and the elimination of some fees.
Beginning in the 1990s, a new set of not-for-profit CCA took advantage of the opportunities
presented by the combination of rapidly increasing consumer debt and the development of
modern communication and data processing techniques to move away from local, in-person
credit counselling and toward large-scale, telephone “counselling” that was focused primarily on
the establishment and administration of debt management plans. The various abuses of these
“new school” credit counsellors led to a Congressional inquiry in 2004 and the revocation of the
20

See the discussion of this agreement in the next section.
Brenda Bouw, "Banks pull out of national credit counselling donation program; individual system instead that
some worry will be more onerous" Canadian Press (26 August 2009).
22
Leslie E Linfield, “Uniform Debt Management Services Act: Regulating Two Related – Yet Distinct – Industries”
(2009) Am BankrInst J 50. Our brief history is based primarily on Linfield’s vesion of that history.
23
Rev Rul 69-441, 1969-2 CB115. This ruling is discussed further in a later section.
21
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not-for-profit status of many of the largest organizations. These developments are discussed in
Section III (c) below.
In recent years, a new form of credit counselling, known as “debt-settlement” has become more
prominent in the US. Operated on a for-profit basis, debt-settlement firms harken back to the
early twentieth century practice of debt-adjusters by seeking to negotiate a reduction in the
principal owed by their clients. Importantly, however, this new generation of debt-adjusters did
not negotiate with the creditors in advance of repayment. Instead, they instruct their clients to
stop making any debt payments in the hope of increasing the willingness of the creditors to
negotiate with the debt-settlement companies. Instead of making payments to creditors, the
debtors build up savings which are intended to fund a negotiated settlement. The debt settlement
firms make no pretense of providing counselling services and, because of their for-profit status,
there is no need for them to do so. As with the earlier set of debt-adjusters, abuses have been
common. In 2008, the US Better Business Bureau listed “debt negotiation” as one of its Top Ten
Scams. Debt settlement companies have arrived in Canada but have not yet become the focus of
a great deal of concern.24
The Retreat of Provincial Governments from Debt Advice
At the same time as the not-for-profit credit counselling industry was evolving away from a
community-based, provincially-funded social service model toward a creditor-funded business
model, provincial governments were backing away from any involvement in providing remedies
to people with debt problems. That involvement has taken two forms: (1) administering Orderly
Payments of Debts (OPD) programs, first under provincial laws and, after 1966, under Part X of
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act; and (2) operating debt advice services. Each of these will be
discussed in turn.
Orderly Payment of Debts
Part X of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) gives provinces the option of administering
an OPD program that allows debtors to pay all of their debts over a four year period with future
interest limited to 5%.25 At one time, six provinces — British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island — operated OPD programs.
British Columbia (in 2002), Manitoba (in 1995) and Prince Edward Island (in 2007) have since
dropped their OPD programs. Only Alberta, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia continue to offer
OPD programs.
24

The study of debt settlement companies in Canada is beyond the scope of this article. For an example of a
Canadian debt settlement company, however, see http://www.ccdr.ca/.
25
R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3; See Jacob Ziegel “The Philosophy and Design of Contemporary Bankruptcy Systems: A
Canada-United States Comparison” (1999) 37 (2) at 250 “Part X of the BIA has its genesis in orderly payment of
debts legislation adopted in Manitoba during the Depression, and subsequently copied in Alberta. The Supreme
Court of Canada held the legislation ultra vires the provinces in a 1960 decision as an encroachment on the federal
government’s exclusive insolvency jurisdiction. This forced the federal government to introduce legislation of its
own, and it did so in 1966 by adding Part X to the BIA. Part X only applies to those provinces that have elected to
adopt it; only six provinces have done so. Andrew Dekany, Consumer Debt Counselling in Canada (Osgoode LLM
Thesis; 1999) argues at page 34 that the six year gap, between 1960 and 1966, when OPD was unavailable as a debt
resolution option "provided an opportunity for the private business sector in Ontario to enter that field."
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Saskatchewan's Provincial Mediation Board came into existence 80 years ago, with wide-ranging
power in relation to debt. Historically, the board dealt predominantly with farm debt, attempting
to help people to keep their farms. Currently, the Board's Credit Counselling and Debt
Management Services office deals with Section X of the BIA. The bulk of the funding (98%) for
the OPD program comes from the Government of Saskatchewan, with the remainder coming
from a 15% levy on the creditor. OPD is one of the few ways to deal with student loans before an
individual has been out of school long enough (seven years) to have such loans discharged
through bankruptcy. Most of the OPD cases handled by the Credit Counselling and Debt
Management Services office therefore involve student loans. In 2010-2011, the Credit
Counselling and Debt Management Services office served 55 individuals and an additional 26
individuals signed up for OPD.26
Provincial Debtor Assistance Programs
Provincially-funded and operated debt advice services are even less common. Such services now
exist in Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan and formerly existed in British Columbia. The numbers
of clients currently served is quite small.
The Saskatchewan Credit Counselling and Debt Management Services program facilitates the
negotiation of a debt settlement agreement between debtors and their creditors. The program
looks into the claims against the debtors, assesses their ability to pay and attempts to settle the
debts with the creditor. The debt counsellor we interviewed told us that she believes that
“everyone who walks in the doors needs to be heard” and that she looks at people’s best interests
and personal situations rather than presuming that OPD is the best way to go. If it makes most
sense to work out a budget rather than sign an individual up for the OPD, the debt counsellor
said that she would take that approach.
Nova Scotia’s Debtor Assistance program offers a variety of programs to people who are in debt
and experiencing financial difficulties.27 Individuals can meet with licensed administrators,
located throughout the province, who will review their situation and discuss available options.28
This advice, which includes both budget and debt counselling, is provided free of charge.29 In
2009-2010, the Debtor Assistance program met with 422 clients; 158 were referred to
bankruptcy trustees, 168 were given budget counselling and 96 were classified as considering a
consumer proposal.30
26

Information in this paragraph was provided in a telephone conversation with Debra Moody, debt counsellor for
the Government of Saskatchewan (July 28, 2011).
27
See Government of Nova Scotia, Debtor Assistance, online: Service Nova Scotia,
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/snsmr/access/individuals/debtor-assistance.asp>; Telephone conversation with Service Nova
Scotia customer service representative (22 July 2011) and Coordinator of Debtor Assistance, Service Nova Scotia
and Municipal Relations (25 July 2011).
28
Telephone conversation with Tamara Ryan, coordinator of the Debtor Assistance Program in Nova Scotia (25 July
2011).
29
Ibid.
30
The numbers appearing here are based on information provided by Tamara Ryan, coordinator of the Debtor
Assistance Program in Nova Scotia.
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British Columbia’s provincially-funded Debtors Assistance Branch was set up in 1974 to take
over the administration of OPD in British Columbia and to provide a range of services to heavily
indebted consumers. The Branch was closed after it was included in a series of cuts to BC social
programs in April, 2002. Debtors Assistance administered the provincial OPD program,
administered consumer proposals under the BIA, offered debt management plans, as appropriate,
and gave impartial advice and information to debtors.31 In addition, with authority conferred by
the BC Debtors Assistance Act, the program could stay collections and negotiate with creditors
to reduce the interest rates for debtors. Douglas Welbanks, the long-time head of the program,
reported that 20-25% of the program’s resources were devoted to resolving a wide range of legal
disputes arising from financial transactions. Much of the remaining agency resources were used
to respond to requests for information (including information concerning help with legal matters)
and to deal with requests for OPD. According to Welbanks, 10-15% of clients were enrolled in
OPD and 10-15% were advised to seek bankruptcy protection. In general, Debtors Assistance
was a source of both information and action on behalf of those who sought its help. Importantly,
it was also a place to which other agencies (including legal aid services, family service agencies
and bankruptcy trustees) could refer clients who they were unable to help.
Ontario never participated in OPD and never operated a provincial debt advice service.
Similarly, Québec never participated in OPD and never operated a provincial debt advice
service.

III.

The Canadian Legal Framework for the Credit Counselling Industry

While the Canadian credit counselling industry and the corresponding regulatory framework
have faced only limited scrutiny, the same cannot be said of their American counterparts. Both
the American credit counselling industry (including both not-for-profit credit counsellors and
for-profit debt-settlement companies) and the regulatory framework within which it operates
have been described in unfavorable terms by a number of commentators:
Critics charge that credit-counseling agencies now provide no social utility and
operate simply as deceptive debt collectors on behalf of creditors. Many critics
also allege illegal financial improprieties related to the agencies' required use of
nonprofit status. Due to the exemption of nonprofits from debt-adjuster laws, this
industry remains largely unregulated. Nevertheless, the FTC [Federal Trade
Commission] and state attorneys general (AGs) have pursued many enforcement
actions against credit-counseling agencies for violations of state and federal
consumer-protection laws.32
31

The information in this paragraph is based on a telephone conversation with Douglas Welbanks and Margaret
Johnson, President of Solutions Credit Counselling Service, on August 22, 2011.
32
Andrew T Schwenk, “Note Debt Settlement: A Beast of Burden without Reins” (2011) 76 Brook L Rev 1165 at
1167. See also: Roger Colinvaux, “Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay” (2011) 11 Fla Tax Rev 1 at
35-36, 45-49; Ryan McCune Donovan, “The Problem with the Solution: Why West Virginians Shouldn’t “Settle”
for the Uniform Debt Management Services Act” (2010) 113 W Va L Rev 209 at 214-32; John Hurst, “Protecting
Consumers from Consumer Credit Counseling” 9 NC Bnk Inst 159 at 162-67; Thomas E Johnson, “Advising the
Financially Beleaguered Client” 9 NCBNKI 159 at 30-31 (WL); Ronald D Kerridge, “Tax-Exempt Credit
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Mark Everson, in a press release announcing the revocation of the charitable status of 41 not-forprofit CCA representing more than 40 percent of industry revenues wrote:
Over a period of years, tax-exempt credit counseling became a big business
dominated by bad actors. Our examinations substantiated that these organizations
have not been operating for the public good and don’t deserve tax-exempt status.
They have poisoned an entire sector of the charitable community.33
As in the American situation, Canadian legislation was not designed with reference to the current
credit counselling industry or potential consumer protection issues that arise as consumers
interact with the industry in increasingly large numbers. Nonetheless, various overlapping
strands of provincial and federal regulation may be used to address potential problems with the
industry - within certain limits.
To the extent that legal concepts of general application from federal and provincial law — such
as misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty — may apply, they require litigation to be
initiated by a consumer of credit counselling services. The usual limits of litigation exist in this
situation: lack of resources, knowledge and an organized group of debtors to move forward with
the claims. It is notable that as a response to such limits, a number of American class actions
have been initiated and settled, but to our knowledge no such action has been undertaken in
Canada. While Canadian regulators, including the Canada Revenue Agency and the Competition
Bureau have an ability to monitor the industry and take action. it is unclear whether the not-forprofit credit counselling industry is on the radar of either regulator. Note that the industry was
not on the radar of the IRS until the 2004 Congressional hearings focused on the industry.
In this section, we briefly set out the regulatory framework that may touch on CCA. First we
consider two concepts of more general application from tort and contract law: misrepresentation
and breach of fiduciary duty. Next, we consider the use of “not-for-profit status” as provided for
under the Income Tax Act. Last, we consider the regulation of CCA as collection agencies. We
do not reach any conclusions on the application of these various concepts to Canadian CCA
currently in operation, but instead describe the concepts in a coordinated way with a view to
Counseling Organizations and the Future of Debt-Settlement Services” 14 Tex Rev L and Pol 343 at 350-54; Lea
Krivinskas, “Don’t File: Rehabilitating Unauthorized Practice of Law-Based Policies in the Credit Counseling
Industry” (2005) 79 Am Bank LJ 51 at 51; Leslie E Linfield, “Credit Counseling Update: The “Perfect Storm”
Brewing” (2005) 24 Apr Am Bankr Inst J 30; Leslie E Linfield, “Consumer Credit Counseling Reform: The Good,
the bad and the ugly” (2004) 23 Nov Am Bankr Inst J 14 at 14; Leslie E Linfield, “Uniform Debt Management
Services Act: Regulating Two Related – Yet Distinct – Industries” (2009) Am Bankr Inst J 50 at 60; Derek S Witte,
“The Bear Hug That is Crushing Debt-Burdened Americans: Why Overzealous Regulation of the Debt-Settlement
Industry Ultimately Harms the Consumers It Means to Protect” (2010) Tex Rev L and Pol 277 at 292-95; Carla
Stone Witzel, “The New Uniform Debt-Management Services Act” (2006) 60 Cons Fin LQ Rep 650 at 650.
33
Nonprofit Credit Counseling Organizations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Oversight Comm. On H. Ways &
Means, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service) cited in Ronald
D Kerridge and Robert E Davis, “Tax-Exempt Credit Counseling Organizations and the Future of Debt-Settlement
Services” (2010) 14 Tex Rev L and Pol 343.
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beginning to outline the existing framework for the regulation of the credit counselling industry.
In doing so, we draw from the American regulatory experience. The goal for this exercise is to
provide context for ongoing assessments of both the industry and the ability of the existing
regulatory framework to deal with potential problems within the industry.
a.

Misrepresentation

i.

Competition Act

In conjunction with provincial consumer protection legislation, Part VI of the Competition Act34
prohibits businesses from making false representations. The term “misleading advertising”
describes a situation in which “a claim about a product or service is materially false or
misleading, in an attempt to persuade the consumer to buy it.”35 To date, we are not aware of
any actions against CCA on the basis of the Competition Act or similar provincial consumer
protection legislation. In contrast, on the basis of similar legislation, actions have been settled or
litigated in the United States for false and misleading representations by CCA on the following
issues:
i.
ii.
credit
iii.
iv.
v.

up-front fees;
the implications of a debt management plan (“DMP”) for a debtor's
rating;
the debts that are covered by a DMP;
that the CCA teaches consumers how to handle credit and finance in the future;
and
that the CCA is a not-for-profit entity.

For example, the case of Alyssa Polacsek et al v Debticated Consumer Counseling Inc et al 36
involved a settlement stemming from allegations that not-for-profit tax-exempt CCA brought
DMP business into a for-profit business, thereby generating “private benefits” in violation of the
CCA’s tax-exempt statuses. 37 Without tax-exempt status, the CCA were found to infringe the
Credit Repair Organizations Act by obtaining fees prior to providing services and by neglecting
to afford necessary disclosures, “contract language” and rights to withdraw mandated by the
Act.38 It is important to note that pursuant to United Cancer Council v Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) may revoke the not-for-profit status from not-forprofit organizations whose earnings inure to a private party.39
In a different example, Laverne Jones Stacey Ness and Kerry Ness et al v Genus Credit
Management Corporation et al involved CCA accused of violating consumer protection laws by
34

Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34, s 52(1).
Industry Canada, Canadian Consumer Handbook 2008-2009, online: Canada’s Office of Consumer Affairs
<http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/eng/ca02374.html>.
36
Case No 8:04-cv-00631PJM (2005), United States District Court, Maryland, Southern Division, online:
<www.polacsekclass.com/pdfs/DCC_NOT_web_050618.pdf>.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Case No 98-2181 and 98-2190 (1999), United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; 26 CFR 1.501(a)1(c), (c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i) (2004).
35
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claiming, without providing necessary disclosures, that DMPs would improve credit, credit
ratings and eliminate late fees.40
Similarly, in McGraw v Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp, the West Virginia Attorney General
secured a settlement in favour of consumers who were charged an up-front fee that was not used
to pay off the consumer’s debt and a monthly service fee of 10% in relation to DMP services,
violating West Virginia’s “debt pooling” statute which prohibits charging fees higher than 7%.41
Two similar cases were settled by the West Virginia Attorney General, specifically McGraw v
Debt Mgmt Credit Counseling Corp42 and McGraw v Help Ministries d/b/a Debt Free. 43 Both
cases involved CCA that charged monthly service fees in excess of 7%. One entity — Debt Free
— charged a one-time “set-up” fee that was not distributed to creditors and charged other illegal
fees, including a monthly fee for “funds handling”, a fee for “credit education”, and an
“administrative fee of $20.00 for failed electronic debits”.44
In an example involving a debt-settlement company, in State of Texas v CSA-Credit Solutions of
Am Inc, the Texas Attorney General alleged that more than 80% of the debts serviced by a CCA
were not settled.45 A final example, also involving a for-profit debt settlement firm, comes from
an action filed by the New York Attorney General against Nationwide Asset Services Inc (NAS),
where the court found that NAS customers were promised a 25 to 40 per cent reduction in their
outstanding debt, which did not materialize. Customers experienced both harassment from
creditors and the destruction of their credit ratings.46 NAS was ordered to pay restitution to 180
consumers who completed the program but paid more in “fees and settlements” than the amount
of their debts.47

40

Case No. 11 181 00295 (2010), Class Action and Commercial Arbitration Tribunal, online:
<http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29365>.
41
State of West Virginia, Office of the Attorney General, Press Release, “Attorney General Secures Settlement
Agreement With Cambridge” (25 May 2006) online: West Virginia Office of the Attorney General
<http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm?ID=35&fx=more>.
42
State of West Virginia, Office of the Attorney General, Press Release, “McGraw Recovers Nearly $92,000 in
Overcharges” (31 January 2006) online: West Virginia Office of the Attorney General <
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm?ID=62&fx=more>.
43
State of West Virginia, Office of the Attorney General, “Attorney General McGraw Secures Settlement With Debt
Free” (13 September 2006) online: West Virginia Office of the Attorney General <
http://www.wvago.gov/press.cfm?ID=83&fx=more >.
44
Ibid.
45
Case No. D-l-GV-09-000417, 261st District Court, Travis County, Texas as cited in Ryan McCune Donovan,
“The Problem With The Solution: Why West Virginians Shouldn’t “Settle” For The Uniform Debt Management
Services Act” (2010) 113 W Va L Rev 209 at FN123.
46
See Andrew T Schwenk, “Note Debt Settlement: A Beast of Burden without Reins” (2011) 76 Brook L Rev 1165
at 1178; See also State of New York, Office of the Attorney General, Press Release, “Attorney General Cuomo
Obtains Court Order Barring Debt Settlement Company That Ripped Off Thousands of NY Consumers from
Operating in NYS Unless It Meets Strict Requirements” (15 October 2009) online: New York Office of the Attorney
General
<http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2009/oct/oct15b_09.html>.
47
Ibid.
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Provincial Consumer Protection Legislation

Provincial consumer protection laws govern all sectors of commercial activity.48 Insofar as credit
counselling services are considered commercial activity, or the entities offering these services
are considered merchants, credit counselling is subject to the provincial laws governing
commercial activity.49 While provincial consumer protection legislation varies from province to
province, the provisions applicable to CCA are similar and govern similar representations to
those noted above as running counter to the section VI of the Competition Act. In particular, the
provincial legislation would be applicable to CCA inducing debtors to enter into contracts for the
purchase of DMPs for the purported purpose of reducing their debts, improving their credit
rating and providing them with credit counselling if such services do not occur. Promotional
materials, and in the case of not-for-profit CCA, Canada Revenue Agency filings assert that
CCA will offer budget counselling and teach consumers about finances and how to handle debts.
If instead CCA enroll most of their clients in DMPs and their dealing with consumers consist of
describing the DMPs and inducing consumers to enroll in such plans, this could be considered a
misrepresentation under provincial consumer protection legislation.
b.

Fiduciary Duty

Organizations have a fiduciary duty towards their stakeholders. The fiduciary principle is a
natural law principle that has become a part of the Anglo-American legal tradition.50
The classic statement by Professor A.W. Scott explains the principle as follows: "A fiduciary is a
person who undertakes to act in the interests of another person."51 In most fiduciary
relationships, “the fiduciary is afforded control over some aspect of the life or property of
another (the beneficiary) with the expectation that the fiduciary will exercise that control for the
benefit of the beneficiary.”52 This principle underlies the duties of loyalty, good faith and care
that apply to corporate directors and officers.53 The concept is embedded through the provincial
and federal corporate law statutes in a similar fashion. 54
A significant feature of the legal landscape surrounding not-for-profit CCA in Canada is the
relationship between the so-called "big five" banks in Canada and the CCA. As noted above, the
Canadian Bankers Association (the "CBA") had, until 2009, managed a "unified donation"
policy, agreed to by each of the five banks, where each of the banks "donated" 22% of the
amount the CCA collected for them back to the CCA. The CBA has made clear to us that they
48

L’union des Consommateurs, “Practice and Ethics of Budget Counselling” (Research Project Final Report
Submitted to Industry Canada’s Office of Consumer Affairs) by Luc Rochefort and Me Marcel Boucher (2006) at 28
online: L’union des Consommateurs <http://www.consommateur.qc.ca/union-desconsommateurs/docu/budget/practices_and_ethic_bc.pdf> [Practice and Ethics of Budget Counselling].
49
Uribe and Tait, supra note 1at 19.
50
Joseph F Johnston Jr, “Natural Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Business Managers” (2005) 8 Journal of Markets
and Morality 27.
51
A W Scott, "The Fiduciary Principle" (1949) 37 Cal L Rev 539 at 540.
52
Ibid at 28.
53
Ibid at 27.
54
For example the Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC, 1985, c C-44 defines the general provision as follows:
122. (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.)
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will not release the details of this policy. Beginning in November, 2009 the CBA indicated that
individual banks now make their own arrangements with individual CCA, arrangements that
were described to us as generally quite similar to the previous “unified donation” policy. The
CBA acknowledged that they had repealed the unified policy as they were concerned that the
CCA had moved away from a counselling function.55 However, the CBA continues to provide a
link to the two main umbrella organizations that represent various Canadian CCA on their web
site and informs debtors of the services that the CBA believes are offered by the CCA.56 This,
among other factors, could possibly change the traditional debtor/creditor relationship to one
where there is a fiduciary duty between the bank and the debtor who consults a CCA.
A bank/debtor fiduciary duty in Canada only arises, however, under very special
circumstances.57 Given the banks' support of the CCA and encouragement of debtors to use the
services, it could be argued that there are special circumstances that lead debtors to place their
trust and confidence in the banks and to rely on their endorsement of the CCA.
The funding structure of not-for-profit CCA arguably contributes to making this a legal grey
area.58 Not only is there the potential for a fiduciary duty to arise as a result of the banks’
relationships with the CCA but this relationship may give rise to disclosure requirements under
provincial consumer protection legislation. Specifically, if the issue is to ascertain whether the
organization offering the counselling service obtains part of its funding through a third-party
creditor to whom the debtor is to make payments is (or is not) an “important fact” within the
meaning of the provincial consumer protection legislation, discussed above, this must always be
disclosed to the consumer (even if this does not affect the amount of debt to be repaid by the
individual).59
c.

Not-for-Profit Status

Under the Income Tax Act,60 a charitable organization is one that meets the following
requirements: all its resources are devoted to charitable activities carried on by the organization
itself,61 no part of its income is payable to, or is otherwise available for, the personal benefit of

55

Email from Andrew Addison, Manager Media Relations, CBA (22 September 2009).
See Canadian Bankers Association, Debt and Credit Counselling, online: <http://www.cba.ca/en/consumerinformation/40-banking-basics/505-debt-and-credit-counselling>. The two umbrella organizations are Credit
Counselling Canada and the Canadian Association of Credit Counselling Services.
57
See M H Ogilvie, “Judicial Intuition and Bank Fiduciary Obligation: Scaravelli v. Bank of Montreal” (2005) 21
BFLR 89; M H Ogilvie, “Banks, Advice-Giving and Fiduciary Obligation” (1985) 17 Ottawa L Rev 262, which
stated that banks owe a fiduciary duty when giving investment advice; see also Dassen Gold Resources Ltd v Royal
Bank, [1995] 1 WWR 171, 161 AR 161 at 139 where the Alberta Queen’s Bench found that a fiduciary duty may be
owed by a bank to a customer who is vulnerable and relies on the bank for advice, and that vulnerability and reliance
is known to the bank.
58
Supra note 5 at 13.
59
Supra note 7, s 14(1).14.
60
RSC, 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [ITA].
61
Ibid, s 149.1(1)(a).
56
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any proprietor, member, shareholder, trustee or settlor,62 and more than 50% of its directors,
trustees, officers or like officials deal with each other and with each of the other directors,
trustees, officers or officials at arm’s length.63
A sampling of the T3010 filings of not-for-profit CCA across Canada reveals that some have
reported their primary charitable purpose as providing family and crisis counselling, and
financial counselling,64 while others also list debt management.65 Other CCA list education and
debt management counselling as a primary purpose,66 and still others indicate that they help
families end financial crises and solve money management problems through education,
providing financial and credit related educational programs to its members, budget and credit
counselling services, as well as debt management.67 To the extent that not-for-profit CCA do not
in fact have these activities as their primary purpose, their not-for-profit status under the Income
Tax Act68 might be questioned. Under section 188.1(1),69 a registered charity that is a private
foundation (or is not private but the business it carries on is not related to the business of the
charity) will be liable to a 5% penalty of its annual gross revenue from any business that it
carries in that taxation year. Section 188.1(2) states that the penalty increases for repeat
offenders.70 Furthermore, a charitable foundation that has acquired control of a corporation (if
more than 50% of the corporation's issued share capital, having full voting rights under all
62

Ibid, s 149.1(b).
Ibid, s 149.1(c).
64
See the 2010 registered charity information returns published by Revenue Canada for the following credit
counselling agencies: Credit Counselling of Regional Niagara, Credit Counselling Service of Durham Region,
Credit Counselling Service of Sault Ste Marie and District, Credit Counselling Service of Toronto, Credit
Counselling Services of Alberta Ltd, Credit Counselling Services of Atlanta Canada Inc, Credit Counselling
Services of Cochrane District, Credit Counselling Services of Newfoundland and Labrador Inc, Credit Counselling
Society of British Columbia, Family and Credit Counselling Services Serving York Region, online: Canada
Revenue Agency < http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/haip/srch/advancedsearchresulteng.action?n=credit+counselling&b=&q=&s=registered&d=&e=+&c=&v=+&o=&z=&g=+&t=+&y=+&p=1>.
65
See the 2010 registered charity information return published by Revenue Canada for Credit Counselling Service
of Simcoe County, online: Canada Revenue Agency < http://www.craarc.gc.ca/ebci/haip/srch/advancedsearchresulteng.action?n=credit+counselling&b=&q=&s=registered&d=&e=+&c=&v=+&o=&z=&g=+&t=+&y=+&p=1>.
66
See the 2009 registered charity information return published by Revenue Canada for InCharge Debt Solutions
Canada, online: Canada Revenue Agency < http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/haip/srch/t3010form21eng.action?b=844341545RR0001&e=2009-1231&n=INCHARGE+DEBT+SOLUTIONS+CANADA&r=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.craarc.gc.ca%3A80%2Febci%2Fhaip%2Fsrch%2Fadvancedsearchresulteng.action%3Fn%3DIn%2BCharge%26amp%3Bb%3D%26amp%3Bq%3D%26amp%3Bs%3Dregistered%26amp
%3Bd%3D%26amp%3Be%3D%2B%26amp%3Bc%3D%26amp%3Bv%3D%2B%26amp%3Bo%3D%26amp%3B
z%3D%26amp%3Bg%3D%2B%26amp%3Bt%3D%2B%26amp%3By%3D%2B%26amp%3Bp%3D1>.
67
See 2010 registered charity information return published by Revenue Canada for Consolidated Credit Counselling
Services of Canada, online: Canada Revenue Agency < http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/ebci/haip/srch/t3010form21eng.action?b=816123749RR0001&e=2010-0930&n=CONSOLIDATED+CREDIT+COUNSELING+SERVICES+OF+CANADA&r=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.craarc.gc.ca%3A80%2Febci%2Fhaip%2Fsrch%2Fadvancedsearchresulteng.action%3Fn%3Dconsolidated%2Bcredit%26amp%3Bb%3D%26amp%3Bq%3D%26amp%3Bs%3Dregistered
%26amp%3Bd%3D%26amp%3Be%3D%2B%26amp%3Bc%3D%26amp%3Bv%3D%2B%26amp%3Bo%3D%26a
mp%3Bz%3D%26amp%3Bg%3D%2B%26amp%3Bt%3D%2B%26amp%3By%3D%2B%26amp%3Bp%3D1>.
68
ITA, supra note 60.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
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circumstances, belongs to the foundation, or to the foundation and persons with whom the
foundation does not deal at arm's length),71 the foundation is liable to 5% penalty of all dividends
it received from that corporation in that particular taxation year.72
As is the case in Canada, and as discussed in Section II, one group of CCA in the United States
has for many years been designated as tax exempt primarily because of their educational
purpose.73 There has been substantial litigation and regulatory intervention in this context in the
United States that may be considered by the Canada Revenue Agency in evaluating the not-forprofit status of the Canadian CCA.
In 1969, a significant ruling rendered by IRS set the groundwork for CCA in the United Status to
operate with not-for-profit status. The IRS determined that the credit counselling organization in
question "was formed to reduce the incidence of personal bankruptcy by informing the public on
personal money management by assisting low-income individuals and families who have
financial problems."74 In that case, the primary purpose was educational in nature, even though
debt management was part of its activities.75 In the wake of that ruling, the number of CCA that
obtained tax-exempt status increased until a series of development in the early 2000s.76
By 2002, there was a perception that abuses by CCA were increasing. A Congressional
subcommittee issued a scathing report in 2004, highlighting the practices of not-for-profit CCA
that had caused considerable harm to consumers and seemed to contravene provisions of their
status as tax-exempt organizations.77 At that point, the IRS began scrutinizing agencies more
closely.78 In addition to revoking the not-for-profit status of some agencies, the IRS held off on
issuing tax-exempt status to several organizations on the basis that there was too much emphasis
on DMPs (in the wake of the Congressional report, just three of 110 agencies that applied for
tax-exempt status received it).79
Further, American case law considering tax-exempt status has addressed concerns about
relationship of the CCA with creditors and their loyalty to them, to the detriment of debtors.80
For example, in Credit Counseling Ctrs, Inc v City of South Portland, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court determined that the magnitude of profits generated by a CCA for creditors
suggested that its business was not "conducted exclusively for benevolent and charitable

71

Ibid, s 149.1(12).
Ibid, s 188.1(3).
73
Supra, note 33. In this section we rely heavily on Kerridge and Davis' work. While Kerridge and Davis focus on
the question whether CCA can take on the function of for-profit debt-settlement firms, they consider broader
questions about the role of not-for-profit CCA. We draw on this aspect of their work.
74
Rev Rul 69-441, 1969-2 CB115.
75
Ibid.
76
Supra note 33 at 350.
77
Supra, note 15.
78
Supra note 33 at 351.
79
Ibid.
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Ibid at 352-353.
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purposes”, or that the revenue it produced was not “purely incidental to a dominant purpose that
is benevolent and charitable.”81
In the Pension Protection Act of 2006,82 the U.S. Congress enacted Section 501(q) which
complements IRS requirements by imposing the following additional requirements on credit
counselling organizations claiming tax-exempt status : “[t]he organization provides credit
counseling services tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of the consumer”;83 “[t]he
organization provides services for the purpose of improving a consumer's credit record, credit
history, or credit rating only to the extent that such services are incidental to providing credit
counseling services and does not charge any separately stated fee for any such services
organization”;84 [t]he organization establishes and implements a fee policy to require that any
fees charged to a consumer for its services are reasonable…”;85 “[t]he organization at all times
has a board of directors or other governing body…that is controlled by persons who represent the
broad interests of the public…”;86 and “[t]he organization receives no amount for providing
referrals to others for debt management plan services, and pays no amount to others for obtaining
referrals of consumers.”87
In Solution Plus, Inc v Commissioner, the Court held that Solution Plus was mainly formed to
sell DMPs.88 Although the agency claimed that its primary purpose was educational and DMPs
would only comprise a small amount of its services and profits, the Court held that the
documents provided by the company itself suggested otherwise and ruled in favour of the IRS. 89
The Court concluded that the primary activity of Solution Plus was not solely educational or for
charitable purposes and that it did not function as an organization with exclusively charitable
goals.90 This decision was based on the finding that the “primary activity would be to provide
DMPs to the general public for a fee that it hopes to collect from its customers and from its
customers' creditors.”91
In the case Better Business Bureau v United States, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “the
presence of a single non-educational purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption
regardless of the number or importance of truly educational purposes”.92 Selling DMPs does not
serve an educational function and the IRS has noted that both courts and the IRS have not found
the provision of debt resolution services to constitute a charitable undertaking.93
The American case law has thus established that the foremost question is whether debt resolution
services comprise an integral part of an agency’s activities.94 The key issue is whether a “non-

81

Credit Counseling Ctrs, Inc v City of South Portland, 814 A.2d 458 (Maine 2003) at 463.
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-280, § 1220, 120 Stat 780, 1086-1088 (2006).
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Ibid, s. 501(q)(1).
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Ibid, s. 501(q)(3).
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Ibid, s. 501(q)(5).
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Ibid, s. 501(q)(6).
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Ibid, s. 501(q)(8).
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Solution Plus, Inc v Comm'r, 95 TCM (CCH) 1097 (2008).
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Ibid at para 18.
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Ibid, at paras 20, 22.
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Ibid, at para 9.
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Better Business Bureau v United States, 326 US 279, 283 (1945).
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IRS Priv Ltr Rul 200450039 (14 September 2004) as cited in supra note 33 at 357.
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Ibid.
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charitable activity is an integral part of an exempt purpose is thus a test of necessity: could the
exempt objective be accomplished only by the activity in question?”95
The role that the IRS has taken in reviewing the activities of not-for-profit and for-profit CCA
and the corresponding tests that have developed through case law for assessing the function and
activities of CCA in the United States, provide useful precedents for a more activist role for the
CRA with respect to the regulation of CCA in Canada. An audit of the extent to which Canadian
CCA comply with their primary charitable status is needed. Based on the American
jurisprudence the following questions could serve as a starting point as part of such an audit:
a.
What is the relationship and loyalty of CCA to creditors as demonstrated by the funding
model of the CCA?;
b.
To what extent do debt resolution services comprise an integral part of the services of the
CCA?;
c.
and

To what extent are the primary activities of the CCA commercial versus educational?;

d.
To what extent are the services provided by the CCA geared to the specific needs of
individual consumers and benefit the consumer – for example, in the form of a better credit
record?
d.

Credit Counselling Agencies as Collection Agencies

Most provincial legislation, and the case law interpreting it, defines CCA as collection agencies.
The result is that they are subject to the same provincial regulation as collection agencies.
L’union des Consummateurs notes: “The jurisprudence ... has established that enterprises which
manage a consumer’s debt repayment to his creditors, whether private businesses or not-forprofits, must be considered equivalent to collection agencies.”96 In Ontario, the Collection
Agencies Act97 governs the licensing and activities of collection agencies. Knowing
contravention of one or more provisions of this statute is considered a provincial offence.
An example of how the Collection Agencies Act has been used to regulate the activities of a CCA
can be found in an Ontario case decided in 2004. In that case, Renew Credit Services Canada
Inc. (Renew) was accused of having engaged in debt collection without a license. The Ontario
trial court held that an enterprise, whether for profit or not, that assisted a consumer in the
management of his debts is considered a collection agency and accordingly must register as such
pursuant to the provisions of the Collection Agencies Act.98 Furthermore, the Court held that this
95

70 TC 594 (1978) at 611 as cited ibid note 33 at 359.
Supra note 5 at 29.
97
Collection Agencies Act, RSO 1990, c C.14 [CAA Ontario].
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Ontario (Ministry of Consumer and Business Services) v Gnish, 2004 ONCJ 399, [2004] OJ No 5684 [Ontario v
Gnish]; CAA Ontario; Supra note 97.
96

2011

DEBTOR ASSISTANCE AND DEBT ADVICE

"<!

was the case even if the organization was not in possession of the sums disbursed by the
consumer for payment to his creditors:
In the client agreement, the client authorizes Renew to "assist in the arrangement and
proposal of an acceptable repayment plan of the Client's debts to their creditors". In its
explanatory instruction manual to clients, Renew advises: "Upon retaining our services you
have given us control of your financial and credit affairs and you are not allowed to
conduct any discussions or make any payment arrangements, orally or in writing without
our authorization. We will handle everything on your behalf".99
The Court went on to hold that:
Therefore it is obvious, based on its own published material, that Renew arranges for
payment of money owing to another person, as set out in the definition of "collection
agency" in the Act, and instructs its clients to advise creditors to contact Renew to discuss
debtors' payment arrangements.
…
I therefore conclude that the true object of the Act and intent of the Legislature is to protect
debtors by requiring that all those who deal with them register in order that the Registrar
may ascertain which, if any, parts of the legislation may apply.100
The defendants, Renew Credit Services Canada Inc., Todd Alexander Gnish and Sherri Graham,
were subsequently convicted for not being registered as a collection agency, and were at the
same time convicted of three other related offenses.101
The Court listed this offence as follows:
Count #4: and further that Renew Credit Services Canada Inc. and Todd Alexander Gnish
and Sherri Graham, on or about the 20th of November 2002, in the Town of Milton in the
central west region and elsewhere in the province of Ontario, did commit the offence of
carry on the business of a collection agency without registration by the Registrar under the
Act, when they contracted with Derek Hardy, a consumer, contrary to section 4 (1) of the
Collection Agencies Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-14, as amended, and thereby committed an
offence contrary to section 28 (1) of the said Act.102
The Court held that:
The Collection Agencies Act in section 4(1) states "no person shall carry on the business of
a collection agency or act as a collector unless the person is registered by the Registrar
under this Act."
Section 29 of this Act states, "that a statement as to, (a) the registration or non-registration
99
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of any person; purporting to be certified by the Director is, without proof of the office or
signature of the Director, admissible in evidence as proof, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, of the facts stated therein."
It is clear from the evidence that the defendants should have been registered, and they
were, not as confirmed by exhibits 10, 11, and 12. No evidence was presented to the
contrary.
I therefore find that the Crown has proven the elements of this offence beyond a reasonable
doubt and I find the defendants guilty of this charge before this Court, and convictions are
registered.103
The limits on collection activity just described do not apply, however, to a person employed by a
member agency of the Ontario Association of Not-For-Profit Credit Counselling Services (see
Appendix).
The Ontario law is similar to the American legislation, which places strict
regulatory standards on collection agencies’ practices but exempts not-for-profit organizations
from such prohibitions.104 These exemptions have been pointed to by a number of commentators
as paving the way for the ills of the not-for-profit credit counselling industry in the United
States.105
e.

Conclusions

Our review of the existing regulatory framework for the credit counselling industry in Canada
suggests that regulation exists but is decentralized and underutilized. We identify four possible
grounds that might justify further investigation by regulatory agencies:
•
•
•
103
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breach of fiduciary duty
violation of the rules that not-for-profit organizations must follow

Ibid at paras 44-47.
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violation of the rules governing collection agencies

Reliance on individual debtors or their lawyers to initiate a class action if there is in fact a breach
of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation or a violation of the Collection Agencies Act on the part of
CCA is unlikely to be effective as the only regulatory vehicle in the Canadian context.106 The
American experience suggests instead that regulator-initiated activity may be a more useful
method of monitoring of CCA practices. If the Competition Bureau and the Canada Revenue
Agency are able to monitor the industry for misrepresentation and to ensure that the not-forprofit CCA stay true to their primary charitable purposes, this would be an important method of
ensuring that CCA do not become a consumer protection problem.
In addition, legislation aimed specifically at regulating the credit counselling industry (for-profit
and not-for-profit) may be considered. One model is the American National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) Uniform Debt-Management Services Act
(UDMSA). Once registered, the UDMSA imposes four "pillars" on both not-for-profit and forprofit CCA:
(1) safeguarding the debtor's money;
(2) disclosing the credit counselor's relationship with and payment by creditors;
(3) requiring adequate financial education; and,
(4) requiring credit counselors to determine that a [debt-management plan] is suitable for the
debtor before enrolling the debtor in [the plan].107
Only a small number of American states have adopted the UDMSA to date; nonetheless, the
legislation and its practical application may be worth considering as Canadian work on
regulating the industry moves forward.
III.

Mystery Calls to Credit Counselling Agencies

To gain insight into what services are actually available to debtors seeking help from CCA, we
have used “mystery shoppers” to conduct a study of the services offered by CCA. While this
study is still on-going, we report here on the general methods that we have adopted and on a
selected set of results.
“Mystery shopping” is commonly used in marketing research as a way to understand how
customers are being treated by retail service industries.108 The method has also been used by
106
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regulatory agencies (including the UK Financial Service Authority and the Financial Consumers
Agency of Canada) to assess the quality of services received by clients of financial service
organizations.109
In essence, the idea is to train research assistants to present standardized scenarios to one or more
organizations and then to assess the responses of the organizations to the scenarios. The
scenarios are generally designed to imply an outcome that designers believe should result and the
question is whether the interaction with the organization leads to that outcome. For example, in a
study of triage health services by Moriarity, McCloud and Dowell, one of the scenarios involved
“a male patient with a past history of rheumatic fever calling about a sore throat” and the proper
outcome was thought to be a referral to a medical practitioner.110 Three other “simulated
patients” were used in the Moriarity, McCloud and Dowell study.
Our idea was to use simulated debtors to assess the advice given by CCA. Each scenario
involved a debtor whose best course of action, in our opinion, would be to file for bankruptcy (or
perhaps a consumer proposal). Our interest was therefore in whether this course of action was
recommended. In light of the claim by CCA that they provide counselling services to their
clients, a secondary interest was to ascertain the extent to which counselling was actually
provided to the simulated debtors.
After receiving ethics clearance from the Research Ethics Boards of our respective universities,
we developed four scenarios and trained several research assistants to be simulated debtors. The
research assistants then called various CCA, including several of the largest not-for-profit CCA,
recording each call.111 The calls reported on in this section are a sample of the 30 calls we
conducted thus far; we will report on the full set of calls in a forthcoming article.
One simulated debtor, named “Nora”, had some equity in her home but had expenses that were
consistently above her income, leading to continued borrowing from a line of credit. The balance
on the line of credit was $19,000 and growing year by year. No other debts existed.
One call by Nora, to one of the “big three” CCA, lasted only 5 minutes and 31 seconds. Given
Nora’s simulated income and debt profile, the counsellor quickly ascertained that the monthly
payment would be just over $400 per month for three and a half years. She then asked Nora if
she could afford to make such a payment; Nora said “no”. The counsellor then said that the only
options available to Nora would be a consumer proposal or a personal bankruptcy, suggested that
Nora look up a local bankruptcy trustee in the Yellow Pages and ended the call.
109
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Another of the calls by Nora, to another of “big three”, was far longer, lasting almost an hour.
After carefully going through Nora’s income and expenses, the counsellor suggested that the
payment required to pay off her debts would be about $550 per month for 48 months; such a
payment would require that her budget be cut by $1,300 per month, an unlikely possibility. The
counsellor then told Nora that “her program” (i.e., the debt management plan) was not a good
option.
I’m not sure that our program is the most appropriate program for you. You do have
equity in the property and if we were to try and send out a proposal to [the bank]
asking them to stop charging interest and to accept a payment over approximately
four years, they may question why you need a program like ours if there’s an ability
to make the payments … That’s the creditors, not credit counselling.
To her credit, the counsellor spent about fifteen minutes going through Nora’s budget after
ascertaining that the DMP would not be appropriate and suggested reductions in her spending
that would make her expenses, not including her existing debt payments, equal to her income.
One call from a simulated low-income debtor named “Brittany” actually involved a mistake by
the research assistant. The profile was supposed to involve a lone parent with a disability and
about a monthly income of about $2,300 from two disability programs. However, the research
assistant forgot to mention one of the two sources of income — a monthly $900 payment —
when she called a CCA located in the Greater Toronto Area. The counsellor assumed, without
being told, that the income was from the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) and told
Brittany that there was a statute of limitations of two years on unsecured debt in Ontario. If
Brittany was to make no payments for two years, and if she referred all calls to the agency, the
debt would “vanish”.112 In return for handling those calls, the agency said there would be a
charge of $240 per month, presumably to be paid from the Brittany’s already inadequate income
of $1,400 per month. Brittany’s experience suggests that, as was true in 1967 for the Credit
Counselling Service of Metropolitan Toronto, those unable to make large enough payments to
support a debt management plan are not well served, if they are served at all.113
A second question that we tried to address with our mystery shoppers was whether the
counselling was intended to help the debtor or to sell debt management debt plans. The former is
suggested by Nora’s call in which the counsellor spent time advising her on her budget after
determining that a DMP was not a good idea. Alternatively, pushing for draconian and
unsustainable budget cuts would imply that the purpose of the suggestions was to sell the DMP.
There is a middle ground, of course, in which reasonable reductions in expenses lead to a budget
that allows for the required DMP payments.
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Where Nora’s call illustrates the first possibility, some of the other calls implied the second. For
example, used Brittany’s simulated debt profile, another research assistant called an organization
set up by one of the “big three” in Montreal to try to tap the Francophone market. This research
assistant presented herself with both disability payments, totaling $2,300 per month.
The counselor first collected the usual income and expenditure information, looking for very
precise information about the debts. There was not much scope for reducing Brittany’s
expenditures but the counsellor was able to create an acceptable budget by proposing draconian
cuts (eliminating almost all discretionary expenditures). If that happened, the counsellor said
there was room to pay about $690 a month for four years and thus clear the debts.
No mention was made of any other method (such as personal bankruptcy or a consumer
proposal) of resolving the debt. Brittany was told that the agency would charge a $50 set-up fee
plus 10% of each month’s $690. No mention was made of the creditors paying the agency for its
services.114 While the counsellor efficiently and pleasantly did the budget adjustment and
figured out the DMP, no actual "counselling" was done.
All the income and expenditure profiles used in this part of the project were ones that could
maintain a DMP only with severe budget cuts. Moreover, the profiles were designed so that
personal bankruptcy or a consumer proposal should have been a viable option.
Our overall impression is that the “counselling” sessions consist primarily of creating a budget
that will satisfy the creditors and thus make the debtor able, at least in principle, to undertake a
debt management plan. That is, the counselling is ancillary to the sale of a DMP. The extent to
which other options were explored varied from no mention at all (as in the case of Brittany’s call
to the Montreal agency) to a reasonably careful explanation of the alternatives. The modal
treatment was a brief mention of personal bankruptcy accompanied by the statement that “we
don’t do bankruptcies” or “you don’t want to do that, do you?” Consumer proposals were almost
never mentioned.
We also asked a colleague in the United Kingdom to arrange a series of calls, using a common
simulated profile, to the UK equivalents of the Canadian CCA (one not-for-profit service and
three for-profit agencies). In addition, a call was made to the National Debtline, a not-for-profit
organization funded partly by the government and partly by the private sector. The common
profile was of a single male with a £7,000 credit card balance and a £9,000 bank loan. This
hypothetical debtor worked in London, earning an after-tax monthly income of £1,900, and lived
in Brighton.
In all cases, the pattern of the calls was similar to that observed in the Canadian calls, starting
with the collection of detailed information about the caller’s monthly income and expenditures.
Nonetheless, the organizations differed in terms of details asked and information given, and how
114
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the debt management schemes were explained. Only three (two of the three private agencies and
the National Debtline) advised that bankruptcy was an option, in addition to a voluntary debt
management plan. Only one, the National Debtline, discussed costs and benefits of bankruptcy
and advised the caller on how to get more information about it. Only the National Debtline
counsellor advised the caller to be sure that his bank account was at a different institution to
where his debts were held—and why.
The quality of counsellors varied across agencies in terms of the clarity of their explanations and
the breadth of the information they provided. All reviewed debts and expenditures; all discussed
debt management plans and the associated process of repayment; all notified the debtor that
creditors do not have to accept offers of repayment (e.g., a DMP). But not all explained that such
plans are voluntary; that is, even if the repayment plan is accepted, the agreement is not legally
binding and the creditors can continue to pursue their legal options. The counsellors explicitly
indicated that the creditors would require minimum repayments of between £100 -£200 per
month for an Individual Voluntary Agreement (IVA) or for the UK equivalent of a Canadian
DMP, whereas the caller indicated he had only about £80 available after his expenditures.115
Only two counsellors told the debtor that there were expenditure guidelines in terms of what
creditors would accept as a budget for debt management plans—guidelines which the caller was
nowhere near meeting.
Only one of the counsellors, from a for-profit agency, was explicit in stating that the caller
needed to re-examine his priorities, remarking: “I recommend you look at your expenses—
currently social over paying debts. You have to make a decision about what’s important: Is it
repaying your debt or your social life?”
One counsellor to whom the caller was referred did not clearly state that the budget she was
trying to construct with the caller was not based on his current expenditures, but was one that he
needed to adopt in order to reduce his expenses so that she could negotiate a debt management
plan with the creditors. She sounded frustrated with his unwillingness to accept the guidelines for
the expenses she proposed. The caller needed to request clarification a few times and was
pressured by her to agree to budget guidelines that he was not comfortable with.
Only the National Debtline counsellor explained clearly that debt management plan was a
voluntary agreement that the caller could negotiate on his own rather than using an agency; she
suggested that he go online and complete budget forms available there, identify how much extra
income he had to pay down debt monthly, and use sample letters to creditors to make his offer of
payment, including letter, budget and a payment. The counsellor explained to him that there are
agencies that will do this part of the negotiation on his behalf (if he so chose), but in all cases, the
result would be a voluntary agreement that has no legal standing, and he might still be taken to
court by creditors. She advised him how to handle that as well. She also advised that he request
115
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that all future correspondence between himself and creditors be in writing and that he not engage
in telephone negotiations. Additionally, this was the only counsellor to really discuss bankruptcy
as a credible option. She explained clearly why bankruptcy was an option and explained the costs
and problems that could be associated with filing for bankruptcy.
The main lesson that we take from the UK calls is that having a source of advice (here, the
National Debtline) that has no financial stake in the outcome of the call is quite important. The
advice given is different and almost certainly more appropriate.
V.

The Task Force on Financial Literacy and the (non)role of the CCA.

In March of 2011, the Task Force on Financial Literacy (TFFL) released its final report,
Canadians and Their Money.116 The report focused almost exclusively on ways to improve the
financial literacy of Canadians by increasing the scope of financial education in the schools and
in the workplace.117 A strong secondary emphasis was to improve the information that is
available to Canadians by creating a comprehensive website devoted to financial matters and
undertaking a broad “public awareness” campaign.118
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States all developed similar
national strategies related to financial literacy before the Canadian Task Force was even
appointed.119 While all of the resulting national strategies focus rather narrowly on the ways in
which financial education and information can improve financial literacy, there is a crucial
difference between Canada and the other countries, especially Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom. Unlike Canada, these countries all make publicly-funded, low-cost and
impartial advice available and all have stronger, more cohesive systems for regulating the
financial services industry. Canada has no analogue to the publicly-funded advice services in
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Moreover, Canadian regulation of retail
financial service suppliers is weak and fragmented across federal and provincial jurisdictions.
Now that the United States (which also lacks low-cost impartial financial advice) has established
116
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its federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,120 Canada has one of the weakest regulatory
regimes among developed countries.
The TFFL Recommendations
Privileging financial education and information
The TFFL report clearly privileges the expansion of financial education as the preferred method
to improve financial literacy. The importance that the TFFL attaches to financial education is
evident throughout its final report. Indeed, it often seems as if the Task Force believes that
financial education is a necessary and sufficient cause of financial literacy. Unfortunately, the
causal link between financial education and financial literacy is not at all clear. In her TFFL
background report, Yoong writes: “no strong consensus exists about the general effectiveness of
financial education programs.”121
Missing from the TFFL final report is any serious consideration of making low-cost impartial
advice available to Canadians. Apart from recommending that the federal government “invest in
the capacity of the voluntary sector to offer financial information, learning and guidance to
Canadians”, 122 the report is silent on this issue. The current situation is that such advice is
available only from a small number of community-based organizations who serve particular local
communities.
Lack of Attention to the Specific Needs of the Poor
For the poor, the TFFL recommendations are punishingly inadequate. Buckland, in his excellent
background report for the Task Force on the financial literacy needs of people with low-income,
emphasizes that “financial literacy needs vary across the population.”123 The implications of this
variation were lost on the Task Force, however, and none of Buckland’s recommendations
appear in the final report.
Overall, the TFFL recommendations are weak and self-serving. A Task Force dominated by
financial service providers and financial educators has recommended little action by the financial
services industry and the expansion of government funding for the services of financial
educators.
Where are the Credit Counselling Agencies in the TFFL Report?
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The credit counselling industry is barely visible in the various reports issued by the TFFL. This
is surprising for at least two reasons. First, the executive director of one of the largest and oldest
Canadian CCA was a member of the Task Force; there was thus no lack of opportunity to bring
the potential contributions of the CCA to the attention of the Task Force. Second, based on its
view of itself, the credit counselling industry is a major source of financial education and a
potential leader in any effort to improve financial literacy.
As an example of latter point of view, the submission to the TFFL by Henrietta Ross, the Chief
Executive Officer of the Canadian Association of Credit Counselling Services (“CACCS”, one
of the three umbrella organizations formed by Canadian CCA) argues that there is a clear “fit”
between the CCA and efforts to promote financial literacy.124
Our enthusiasm [for financial literacy] stems from our historical grassroots
advocacy for healthy personal finances as being essential for Canadians, coupled
with our deep and unique expertise in providing financial literacy training and
education. Specializing in the field of financial literacy is our core competency.125
Later, Ross claims that the CACCS has been “providing personal financial education to
thousands of Canadians and personal financial practitioners”126 and recommends that the TFFL
“outsource the provision and delivery of financial literacy services and the important “hands-on”
training to CACCS and its network” .127
Credit Counselling Canada (“CCC”) competes with CACCS as one of the umbrella organizations
for not-for-profit CCA. Together with its member agencies, it also claims a focus on financial
education:128
Our collective approach within CCC to financial literacy and the needs of
Canadians comes from many years of providing financial education on many
fronts. There are few associations like CCC that have the scope of experience
with Canadians across the country, from all walks of life.
And, like CACCS, it believes that it should be in the vanguard of efforts to improve financial
literacy.129
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Credit Counselling Canada (whether through the association or through various
members) must be involved in any development in a National Strategy
implementation on financial literacy.
Coupled with the T3010 declarations concerning the educational goals of the CCA, the picture is
one of a set of not-for-profit organizations aimed at helping all Canadians deal with debt
problems and helping them learn to better handle their personal finances.
But, as our mystery calls suggest, the nature of the “training and education” is uncertain. The
CACCS submission mentions the “260 counselling minutes” that are provided during the typical
48-month DMP suggesting that the counselling occurs in the context of the DMP.130 But there
are also claims about thousands of people who “were provided telephone consultation”,
“attended preventative educational programs” or “received service outreach and delivery touch
points”.131
The individual submissions of the CCA are largely about financial education and their long
experience in providing it. Some, like Credit Counselling Services of Atlantic Canada , a CCC
member, promote their own educational outreach efforts without mentioning their links to
creditors or their focus on DMPS.132 Others present a more balanced point of view. The Credit
Counselling Society of BC, another CCC member, writes:133
Not-for-profit credit counselling organizations have a mandate to educate consumers and
provide solutions that will allow people to regain financial stability. However, many
consumers are not aware that no /low cost credit counselling services are available to
them, not only as an alternative to bankruptcy, but also for information, guidance and
support as they try to get their finances back on track. Funding for our education and
counselling services and programs is provided in large part by the credit granting
community and creditors place tremendous value on how we are able to assist consumers.
The Task Force seems to have ignored both the CCA claims to expertise and their offers to take
over Canadian financial literacy efforts. The TFFL final report barely mentions the credit
counselling industry in any of its reports. The industry is mentioned in two paragraphs of the
final report with a cryptic recommendation that “Canadians must be better informed about the
services offered by CCA and the differences between the not-for-profit and for-profit agencies
involved.”134 After studying this industry for some time, we are uncertain about these services
and differences. The only other mention of the industry is as a “stakeholder” in financial literacy
efforts.135
130

Supra note 121 at 3.
Ibid at 2.
132
CCS of Atlantic Canada. Submission to the Task Force On Financial Literacy (2010) online:
http://www.financialliteracyincanada.com/submissions/submissions-C-eng.html ; Money Mentors. Submission to the
Task Force On Financial Literacy (2010) online:
http://www.financialliteracyincanada.com/submissions/submissions-M-N-eng.html.
133
CCS of BC. Submission to the Task Force On Financial Literacy (2010) online:
http://www.financialliteracyincanada.com/submissions/submissions-C-eng.html. Unpaginated.
134
Supra note 116 at 22-23.
135
Ibid at 25.
131
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VI.

Conclusion

The credit counselling industry in Canada consists of a variety of businesses, both for-profit and
not-for-profit, whose fundamental activity is setting up arrangements that allow debtors to repay
some of their debts — mainly credit card debts — at lower post-arrangement interest rates than
they would otherwise face. The CCA make the arrangement, the debtors make a single monthly
payment to the CCA and the CCA divides up the debtor’s payment among the creditors. In return
for their work, the CCA are paid by both the creditors and the debtors. From the creditors, they
receive a percentage of whatever the debtors’ pay to the creditors, generally on the order of 20%.
From the debtors, they ask for about 10% of the monthly payment made to the creditors.
The “credit counselling” component of the industry is always secondary to the establishment of
DMPs but, even then, is sometimes almost non-existent. While some CCA will provide free
advice to debtors, most limit their counselling to the budgeting that is necessary to establish and
maintain a debt management plan. Some have facilities where debtors can interact face-to-face
with staff but most now do their business entirely over the telephone and internet.
Over time, the nature of the industry has changed dramatically. In its early years, the CCA were
community-based, government-funded not-for-profits. In recent years, they have become freefloating enterprises, needing only a call center and a website to carry on their work with debtors.
Competition has intensified, especially in the Greater Toronto Area, but also across Canada
through the internet. The competition has led to advertising expenditures in the millions of
dollars for the larger CCA.
In this article, we have traced the history of the industry, suggested avenues through which
regulators could ascertain whether better regulation was needed, and reported on a number of
“mystery calls” to CCA. The regulatory framework within which CCA function could be used in
a variety of ways to explore possible grounds on which some CCA might be violating the rules
that are in place. We identify four ways in which some CCA might be violating those rules:
misrepresenting what they do, not complying with their fiduciary duties, not complying with the
rules surrounding not-for-profit status, and acting as collection agencies without being licensed
to do so. Ascertaining whether any CCA are in violation of existing rules would take some time
and require action by a variety of regulatory agencies.
Another avenue for better regulation would be to require a licensing system for CCA. Douglas
Welbanks, the former director of British Columbia’s Debtor Assistance Branch, believes that
provincial licensing authorities for not-for-profit and for-profit credit counselors should enact
clearly defined provisions regulating all of their activities including the setting of reasonable fees
charged debtors and creditors. He thinks that high standards for ethical conduct and a thorough
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qualifying examination for the credit counsellors would further protect and uphold the public
interest. No such requirements are now in place.136
Ultimately, we believe that there is a need for low- or no-cost neutral debt advice. In this paper,
we do not reach a conclusion as to whether not-for-profit CCA should be providing this advice,
but we doubt that the existing situation is in the best interests of low-income debtors.

Appendix

136

Telephone conversation with Douglas Welbanks and Margaret Johnson, President of Solutions Credit
Counselling Service, on August 22, 2011.
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Competition Act
Part VI: OFFENCES IN RELATION TO COMPETITION
False or misleading representations
52. (1) No person shall, for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the supply or use of
a product or for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, any business interest, by any
means whatever, knowingly or recklessly make a representation to the public that is false or
misleading in a material respect.137
Consumer Protection Act (Ontario)
PART III
UNFAIR PRACTICES
False, misleading or deceptive representation
14. (1) It is an unfair practice for a person to make a false, misleading or deceptive
representation.
Examples of false, misleading or deceptive representations
(2) Without limiting the generality of what constitutes a false, misleading or deceptive
representation, the following are included as false, misleading or deceptive representations:
…
14. A representation using exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact or failing to
state a material fact if such use or failure deceives or tends to deceive.
…
16. A representation that misrepresents the purpose of any charge or proposed charge.
Unconscionable representation
15. (1) It is an unfair practice to make an unconscionable representation.
Same
(2) Without limiting the generality of what may be taken into account in determining whether a
representation is unconscionable, there may be taken into account that the person making the
representation or the person’s employer or principal knows or ought to know,
(a) that the consumer is not reasonably able to protect his or her interests because of disability,
ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the language of an agreement or similar factors;
(b) that the price grossly exceeds the price at which similar goods or services are readily
available to like consumers;
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(c) that the consumer is unable to receive a substantial benefit from the subject-matter of the
representation;
(d) that there is no reasonable probability of payment of the obligation in full by the consumer;
(e) that the consumer transaction is excessively one-sided in favour of someone other than the
consumer;
(f) that the terms of the consumer transaction are so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable;
(g) that a statement of opinion is misleading and the consumer is likely to rely on it to his or her
detriment; or
(h) that the consumer is being subjected to undue pressure to enter into a consumer
transaction.138
Collection Agencies Act (Ontario)
Definitions
1. (1) In this Act,
“collection agency” means a person other than a collector who obtains or arranges for
payment of money owing to another person, or who holds out to the public as providing
such a service or any person who sells or offers to sell forms or letters represented to be a
collection system or scheme;
“collector” means a person employed, appointed or authorized by a collection agency to
collect debts for the agency or to deal with or trace debtors for the agency;
…
REGISTRATION
Registration
4. (1) No person shall carry on the business of a collection agency or act as a collector
unless the person is registered by the Registrar under this Act.
Name and place of business
(2) A registered collection agency shall not carry on business in a name other than the
name in which it is registered or invite the public to deal at a place other than that
authorized by the registration.
Practices prohibited
22. No collection agency or collector shall,
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Consumer Protection Act, SO 2002, c 30, Sch A, ss 14(1), 14(2)14, 14(2)16, 15 [CPA Ontario].
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(a) collect or attempt to collect for a person for whom it acts any money in addition to the
amount owing by the debtor;
(b) communicate or attempt to communicate with a person for the purpose of collecting,
negotiating or demanding payment of a debt by a means that enables the charges or costs
of the communication to be payable by that person;
(c) receive or make an agreement for the additional payment of any money by a debtor of a
creditor for whom the collection agency acts, either on its own account or for the creditor
and whether as a charge, cost, expense or otherwise, in consideration for any forbearance,
favour, indulgence, intercession or other conduct by the collection agency;
(d) deal with a debtor in a name other than that authorized by the registration; or
(e) engage in any prohibited practice or employ any prohibited method in the collection of
debts.
Offences
28. (1) Every person who, knowingly,
(a) furnishes false information in any application under this Act or in any statement or
return required to be furnished under this Act or the regulations;
(b) fails to comply with any order, direction or other requirement made under this Act; or
(c) contravenes this Act or the regulations,
and every director or officer of a corporation who knowingly concurs in such furnishing,
failure or contravention is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not
more than $50,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less one day,
or to both.
Corporations
(2) Where a corporation is convicted of an offence under subsection (1), the maximum
penalty that may be imposed upon the corporation is $250,000 and not as provided therein.
Order for compensation, restitution
(3) If a person is convicted of an offence under this Act, the court making the conviction
may, in addition to any other penalty, order the person convicted to pay compensation or
make restitution.139
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1. Section 19.1 of Regulation 74 of the Revised Regulations of Ontario, 1990 is
revoked and the following substituted:
19.1 (1) The restriction in subsection 4 (1) of the Act against a person acting as a collector,
unless the person is registered by the Registrar under the Act, does not apply to a person
employed by an incorporated full or associate member agency of the Ontario Association
of Not-For-Profit Credit Counselling Services.
(2) The following provisions do not apply to an incorporated full or associate member
agency of the Ontario Association of Not-For-Profit Credit Counselling Services:
1. Section 22 of the Act.
2. Section 11.
(3) Section 15 does not apply to an incorporated full or associate member agency of the
Ontario Association of Not-For-Profit Credit Counselling Services or to the officers or
directors of that member agency.140
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